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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation was to respond to the call offered by James (1998;
James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2001) for the development and validation of new
indirect measurement systems applicable to implicit social cognitions. Such a
measurement system is described herein. This measurement system is based on the
notion of differential framing—that is, the idea that individuals with different
personalities tend to frame the same situations and stimuli in qualitatively different
manners. A test based on differential framing was developed to assess framing
proclivities associated with dispositional aggression. This test is called the Differential
Framing Test or DFT. Data were collected and analyzed from four different samples.
The DFT demonstrated strong predictive validity yielding cross-validities in the .305 and
.403. Furthermore, and in direct contrast to many indirect measurement systems (e. g.,
Thematic Apperception Test), the current measurement system demonstrated appropriate
levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability, given its early stage of
development. Overall, it appears that differential framing represents a viable approach to
measuring personality-related implicit cognitions. Furthermore, this approach yields
results that are not redundant with other measures of implicit social cognitions (e. g.,
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Hogan (1991) identifies two qualitatively different definitions of personality. The
first definition refers to “a person’s social reputation and the manner in which he or she is
perceived by friends, family, co-workers, and supervisors”(p. 875). This definition
emphasizes the public and explicit dimensions of personality. By definition, these
dimensions are available for social observation and/or introspection on the part of the
individual. Researchers subscribing to this definition are frequently interested in
measuring observable trait behavior and/or the self-attributed (i.e., reputational) aspects
of personality as manifested in explicit needs, motives, and values (cf. Cattell, 1957;
Costa & McCrae, 1992; Edwards, 1959; Goldberg, 1993; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Hogan, 1991; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; Jackson, 1984; Lanyon & Goodstein,
1997; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Winter, John,
Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).
Hogan’s (1991) second definition of personality refers to “the structures,
dynamics, processes, and propensities inside a person that explain why he or she behaves
in a characteristic way” (p. 875). This definition emphasizes the often implicit or
unconscious cognitive-affective systems and structures that engender explicit behavior.
By definition, these underlying dimensions of personality are not available for social
observation and/or introspection on the part of the individual. Researchers subscribing to
this definition are often interested in measuring such aspects of personality as
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unconscious needs and motives, implicit cognitions, and latent cognitive-affective
structures (cf. Brewin, 1989; Epstein, 1994; Freud, 1959; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Hogan, 1991; James, 1998; James et al., 2001; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Kihlstrom,
1987, 1999; Kihlstrom, Mulvaney, Tobias, & Tobis, 2000; McClelland et al., 1989;
Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Murray, 1938; Westen, 1991, 1998; Westen & Gabbard, 1999;
Winter et al., 1998).
To date, the vast majority of work within Industrial and Organizational
Psychology (I/O psychology) and Organizational Behavior (OB) has focused on
explicating and measuring personality variables associated with the first definition. That
is, the majority of research has emphasized identifying taxonomies of explicit trait
behavior and then building (largely) introspective assessment instruments to measure
these explicit aspects of personality. These instruments most typically take the form of
self-report surveys (cf. Costa & McCrae, 1992; Edwards, 1959; Hogan, 1991; Hogan &
Hogan, 1995; Hough & Schneider, 1996; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Schwarz, 1999;
Watson & Clark, 1992, 1994).
Accompanying this strong emphasis on the development and validation of explicit
personality measures is the scarcity of recent research attempting to model and measure
the implicit or unconscious aspects of personality (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James &
Mazerolle, 2002). Researchers who have attempted to measure implicit personality
characteristics typically have relied on indirect measures (i.e., those in which individuals
are unaware that the answers they are providing are being used to measure a specific
aspect of personality). Indeed, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) observe that indirect
measures are "theoretically essential" for the measurement of implicit cognitions.
However, these authors continue by noting that the development of such measures
...has not yet been achieved in the efficient form needed to make
research investigation of individual differences in implicit social
cognition a routine undertaking. When such measures do become
available, there should follow the rapid development of a new
industry of research on implicit cognitive aspects of personality
and social behavior (p. 20).
This dissertation attempts to address this research deficiency through the development
and initial validation of a new measure of implicit social cognitions associated with
dispositional aggression.
In the following sections the author 1) briefly reviews the construct of aggression,
describing how it has been traditionally conceptualized and measured, 2) suggests that
extant measurement systems fail to reliably assess individual differences in implicit
cognitions associated with aggression, 3) describes how the Conditional Reasoning
measurement system was specifically developed to assess these implicit cognitions, and
4) introduces a new measurement system derived from Conditional Reasoning designed
to assess implicit framing proclivities associated with aggression.
Traditional Approaches to Defining and Measuring Aggression
Definition
Aggression refers to the desire or motive to harm, injure, attack, or punish another
person (Murray, 1938). Aggressive individuals tend to dislike the target of aggression,
have a strong desire to inflict harm on the target, and lack self-regulatory skills that
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would permit alternative (i.e., non-aggressive) responding (of. Baron & Richardson,
1994; Berkowitz, 1993; Crick & Dodge, 1994; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al.,
2001). This definition highlights the disruptive, counterproductive, dysfunctional, and
antisocial outcomes associated with uncontrolled or unhamessed aggression. As such,
aggression is psychologically distinct from healthier and more functional constructs such
as dominance, assertiveness, and achievement striving (cf. Berkowitz, 1993; Costa &
McCrae, 1992; Hogan, 1991; Hogan & Hogan, 1995; James, 1998; James & Mazerolle,
2002; Murray, 1938).
Aggressive behavior may take many forms ranging from the obvious to the subtle.
Although a number of different frameworks exist for classifying aggressive behaviors,
Buss (1961) has offered one of the most comprehensive taxonomies. According to this
taxonomy, aggressive behavior may be classified along three dimensions: physical-
verbal, active-passive, and direct-indirect. Baron and Folger (1996) note that physical
acts of aggression include unwanted touching, unwanted physical restraint, or assault
with a weapon, whereas verbal acts of aggression rely on the use of words to convey
threats, insults, or obscenities. Active forms of aggression "inflict harm through the
performance of some behavior. . .[whereas] people inflict passive aggression by
withholding some action" (p. 67, Baron & Folger 1996). Direct acts of aggression
involve inflicting harm on the specific target of aggression. Indirect acts of aggression
involve inflicting harm on something that the target values (Baron & Folger, 1996).
Thus this taxonomy is useful for classifying behaviors including, but not limited
to, murder, assault, dirty looks, sarcasm, theft, sabotage, showing up late for meetings,
plagiarism, intentional work slow downs, sexual harassment, cheating, failure to return
phone calls, hiding needed resources, threats, spreading rumors, failure to deny false
rumors, failure to defend target, refusing target’s request, arson, sabotage, unfair
performance evaluation, yelling, and lying (Buss, 1961; Folger & Baron, 1996).
Traditionally, psychologists interested in predicting these forms of aggressive behaviors
have relied on either self-report personality surveys or projective personality tests.
Self-Reports
 
Self-report surveys are designed to directly assess those aspects of behavior,
thought, and affect that are available for observation or introspection (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Hogan (1991) refers to this explicit component
of personality as one’s “reputation”, whereas McClelland et al. (1989) refers to this
component as one’s “self-attributed” motive. Regardless ofhow they are labeled, these
components of personality emphasize explicit cognitions arrived at via introspective self-
report or explicit behaviors measured Via observation.
Most omnibus personality inventories contain a primary scale or subscale
specifically designed to measure aggression and/or hostility (Costa & McCrae, 1992;
Goldberg, 1999; Hogan & Hogan, 1995; Jackson, 1984). Within the context of the Five
Factor model, these scales are typically associated with the general factors of
agreeableness and/or neuroticism (cf. Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; Hogan &
Hogan, 1995). The typical survey instructs respondents to endorse statements describing
particular behaviors or emotions (e. g., “I have a violent temper”, “I often get into fights
with others”; “I am easily angered”). Respondents typically respond using either a “yes—
no” format or a Likert-type format such as strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and
strongly disagree.
Though the popularity of self—reports in I/O psychology has been reestablished in
recent years (of. Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; James & Mazerolle,
2002) they do have at least two major limitations. The first limitation stems from the
ease with which respondents can consciously manipulate their scores on self-reports. The
terms impression management, response distortion, socially desirable responding, and
faking are often used to describe these overt and purposeful adjustments to self-report
scores by respondents (Edwards, 1970; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Paulhus,
1984; Rosse, Stecher, Levin, & Stokes, 1998; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). The
fakeability of self-reports may be related to the second major shortcoming—low
empirical validity.
Numerous primary and meta-analytic studies have demonstrated that self-reports
tend to have low correlations with behavioral criteria such as job performance, academic
performance, and performance in training programs (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hurtz &
Donovan, 2000; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Spangler, 1992; Tett,
Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Indeed, James and Mazerolle (2002) report that the mean
(uncorrected) criterion-related validity for self-reports is approximately .12. This
suggests that, on average, self-reports account for roughly 1 to 2 % of the variance in
important behavioral criteria such as job performance. (This suggests nearly all of the
variance in many important criterion behaviors may be attributed to other causes, one of
which may be implicit personality characteristics such as latent needs and motives [James
& Mazerolle, 2002].)
Even with these shortcomings, the fact that self-reports measure explicit
cognitions and overt behavior in a psychometrically reliable and consistent manner has
secured their place in personality measurement. Indeed, Hogan and colleagues (1991;
Hogan & Hogan, 1995; Hogan et al., 1996) aptly note that an individual’s self-ascribed
cognitions and emotions (i.e., self-perceptions) contribute to a full understanding of his or
her personality. Though self-perception is necessary for understanding an individual’s
personality, it only represents a piece of the personality puzzle. By focusing solely on
explicit descriptions of one's personality, researchers may be overlooking other important
aspects of personality—namely, the implicit cognitions noted above (Greenwald &
Banaj i, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 2002). What is needed then, are reliable and valid
measures that assess implicit cognitions associated with personality.
Proiective Techniques
Traditional approaches to measuring implicit cognitions may be described as
“projective techniques.” Whereas self-reports represent a direct measurement system,
projective techniques are indirect measurement systems because they “neither inform the
subject of what is being measured nor request self-report concerning it” (p. 5, Greenwald
& Banaji, 1995). The typical projective test has participants provide unstructured
responses to vague stimuli (Anderson & Anderson, 1951; James & Mazerolle, 2002;
Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997; Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000; Murray, 193 8). The
unstructured answers are then interpreted by one or more psychologists who make
inferences concerning the respondent’s implicit needs, motives, values, or cognitions.
One of the more popular projective tests in I/O psychology has been the Thematic
Apperception Test or TAT (James & Mazerolle, 2002). The TAT consists of 30 black
and white pictures containing ambiguous situations. Respondents are asked to describe a
story that could explain the contents of one or more of the pictures. Little structure is
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imposed on the respondents; rather they are left to their own devices to generate the story.
Psychologists then interpret and evaluate the unstructured responses using a variety of
scoring protocols ranging from very simple to highly complex (James & Mazerolle,
2002; Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Any single story can be scored for multiple latent needs or
motives. Within I/O psychology, the TAT has been used to measure implicit motives
such as power, achievement, dominance, and autonomy (e. g., McClelland et al., 1989).
As an aside, it is worth noting that within I/O psychology the TAT (or any other
projective test for that matter) has rarely been used to measure implicit cognitions
associated with “dark side” constructs such as aggression or narcissism (cf. Baumeister,
Smart, & Boden, 1996; Gustafson & Ritzer, 1995; Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994;
Hogan, Raskin, & Fazzini, 1990; Kagan, 1990; Lowman, 1996).
The general popularity of projective tests has waned since its zenith during the
19403, due in part to several shortcomings associated with these techniques. Similar to
self-report surveys, projective tests tend to have low empirical validity. Many reviews
suggest correlations between projective techniques and behavioral criteria rarely exceed
.30, and are often in the .105 and .20s (cf. James & Mazerolle, 2002; Lilienfeld, et al.,
2000; Spangler, 1992). Furthermore, the subjective nature of the testing and scoring
process often yields low estimates of internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities for
these techniques (Anastasi, 1982; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Lilienfeld, et al.; Nunnally,
1978). Finally, projective techniques tend to be difficult and time consuming to
administer (James & Mazerolle, 2002). Within I/O psychology, these shortcomings have
born witness to the dearth of research examining implicit cognitions as they relate to
individual and organizational variables (James & Mazerolle, 2002).
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Nevertheless, outside of I/O psychology, momentum is building for the inclusion
of implicit cognitions in theory and research, due in part to the belief that these cognitions
may account for additional variance in import criterion behaviors (cf. Brewin, 1989;
Dreessen, Arntz, Hendriks, Keune, & van-den-Hout, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; Greenwald & Famham, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;
James & Mazerolle, 2002; Kihlstrom, 1987, 1999; Kihlstrom, et al., 2000; Koole,
Dijksterhuis, & van-Knippenberg, 2001; McClelland et al., 1989; Mischel & Shoda,
1995; Russo, Fox, & Bowles, 1999; Westen, 1991, 1998; Westen & Gabbard, 1999;
Winter et al., 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Parks, 2001). However, the principal factor
limiting the widespread integration of implicit social cognitions across all areas of
psychological theory has been the lack of valid and reliable measurements systems
(Greenwald & Banaj i, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Traditional measurement




The expansion of implicit cognitions into many areas of psychological theory and
research has not been met by a similar expansion in the development of measurement
systems designed to assess these cognitions. This is unfortunate because existing
measurement systems are simply inadequate for assessing these implicit cognitions.
Though self-reports do have redeeming qualities (e.g., high reliability, stable five-factor
taxonomy), by definition, they are incapable of assessing unconscious cognitions.
Projective techniques on the other hand were specifically designed to assess these
cognitions, however, they are limited by poor reliability and, similar to self-reports, tend
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to have low empirical validity. Taken together this suggests new indirect measurement
systems are needed that: 1) reliably assess implicit cognitions, 2) have strong criterion-
related validity, and 3) are applicable to a wide range of psychological constructs.
Research on James’ (1998) Conditional Reasoning measurement system suggests that it
meets these minimum criteria.
Use of Conditional Reasoning to Measure Implicit Cognitions
Addressing the need for psychometrically sound measures of implicit cognitions,
James (1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al. 2001) has offered a new
measurement technology applicable to personality assessment called Conditional
Reasoning. This measurement system indirectly assesses implicit cognitions associated
with a wide range of personality dispositions. The measurement system has been used
for assessing both “functional” personality constructs such as achievement motivation,
fear of failure, and reliability, as well as “dysfunctional” constructs such as aggression,
narcissism, and anti-social personality characteristics.
Tests designed using this new methodology have demonstrated strong
psychometric characteristics including internal consistency reliability, test-retest
reliability, and criterion-related validity (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James
et al. 2001). In fact, James et al. report an average uncorrected validity of .43 against a
range of behavioral criteria. These impressive validities are likely due, at least in part, to
the indirect nature of Conditional Reasoning Tests or CRTs. The indirect nature of CRTs
makes them less susceptible to conscious response biases such as faking (LeBreton,
Burgess, & James, 2000). That is, because individuals are unaware of the purpose of
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assessment, they are not able to intentionally manipulate, distort, or enhance their scores
on these tests.
At the heart of the Conditional Reasoning system is the idea that individuals want
to believe that their behavior is rational, reasonable, logical, and appropriate. In order to
maintain the illusion of rationality, aggressive individuals rely on implicit reasoning
biases to enhance the logical appeal of their aggressive behavior (James & Mazerolle,
2002; James et al., 2001). James (1998) refers to these implicit biases as justification
mechanisms (JMs) to emphasize the critical role they play in justifying aggressive
behavior.
Figure 1-1 was adapted from the discussion presented in James and Mazerolle
(2002; Chapter 3) and presents a general overview of the Conditional Reasoning process.
As this figure suggests, people with different personality dispositions tend to rely on a
number of different cognitive biases (e.g., rationalization, attributional biases) when
observing and interpreting people, situations, and events.
James and Mazerolle (2002) present nine general categories of cognitive bias that
produce any number of specific personality-driven JMs. These JMs are used to enhance
the rational appeal of dispositional or motive-based behavior by impacting the reasoning
and analysis used by individuals when evaluating their behavioral responses to various
situations and stimuli. Although these JMs may be generally classified into the broad
categories of implicit cognitive biases identified by James and Mazerolle (2002), each
personality disposition will have a unique set of JMs (James, 1998; James et al., 2001).
That is, aggressive individuals rely on a unique set of JMs to justify their aggressive
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situations and their responses to these situations. Specifically, JMs impact cognitive
processes such as perception (e.g., selective attention), information search strategies (e. g.,
confirmatory biases), reasoning, and causal inference. Aggressive individuals use these
JMs to enhance the rational appeal of their aggressive behavior and to provide a context
for the self-perception of rationality and appropriateness.
Take for example two individuals working on a report for their boss. Both
individuals receive feedback from a co-worker regarding some potential problems with
the report. The aggressive individual may frame and interpret this feedback as overly
critical, malicious, hostile, and combative. Furthermore, he or she suspects the coworker
is trying to degrade and embarrass them. As a result, this individual may verbally assault
the coworker and storm out of the room. On the other hand, the non-aggressive
individual frames and interprets the feedback as helpful, considerate, developmental, and
instrumental toward improving his or her performance. He or she would likely thank the
coworker and adopt his or her suggestions for improving the report.
In this example, the aggressive individual framed the comments of his or her
coworker as critical and combative, whereas the non-aggressive individual framed these
exact same comments as helpful and supportive. According to James and Mazerolle
(2002), these differences in how feedback was framed and evaluated represent an
example of differential framing. Differential framing is defined as the qualitative
disparities in the meaning assigned to the gan_e situations, attributes, or events by
individuals with different personalities (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002).
Here the aggressive individual’s initial framing was further shaped by another
personality-related cognitive bias (i.e., an attributional bias). That is, the aggressive
l4
individual’s attribution that the behavior of the coworker was hostile, malicious, and
intended to be degrading was affected by a hostile attribution bias related to his or her
aggressive personality (Crick & Dodge, 1994). In contrast, the non-aggressive
individual’s observations and interpretations were not impacted by this same bias. The
aggressive individual may further rely on this bias if asked to justify his or her aggressive
behavior (e.g., “My reaction was appropriate because my coworkers are all out to get me
and I needed to defend myself”). Aggressive individuals who routinely call upon this
bias to interpret situations and draw causal inferences regarding the behavior of others, as
well as to justify their own aggressive behavior are said to have the JM ofthile
attribution bias (Crick & Dodge, 1994; James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et
a1. 2001).
For another example, aggressive individuals may frame others using the contrast
of strength versus weakness. For the aggressive individual, acts of aggression connote
bravery, strength, and assertiveness, whereas non-aggressive acts connote weakness,
impotence, and fear. Individuals who routinely frame others in this manner and rely on
this framing to justify their aggressive behavior are said to have the JM of potency bias 
(James, 1998). Other JMs have been identified and explicitly discussed in James (1998),
James and Mazerolle (2002), and James et a1. (2001) and are presented in Table 1-1.
It is important to recognize that differential framing underlies all of the JMs
presented in Table 1-1. That is, each JM may be thought of as the combination of
differential framing with one or more additional cognitive biases (e. g., attributional bias;
leveling, rationalization). The two examples provided above demonstrate how
dispositionally aggressive individuals may rely on implicit framing and other cognitive
15
Table 1-1
Justification Mechanisms Associated with Aggression
 
Hostile Attribution Bias: tendency to see malevolent intention in the actions of others. Even benign or
friendly acts may be seen as having hidden, hostile agendas designed to intentionally inflict harm. An
especially virulent form of this bias occurs when benign or positive acts are attributed to selfish concerns
and negative incentives.
Potency Bias: tendency to frame and reason using the contrast of strength versus weakness. For example,
people with a strong potency bias tend to frame others on a continuum ranging from (a) strong, assertive,
powerful, daring, fearless, or brave to (b) weak, impotent, submissive, timid, compliant, conforming, or
cowardly.
Derogative of Target Bias: an attempt to make the target more deserving of aggression. For example, a
number of negative characteristics may be ascribed to the target (e.g., evil, corrupt, immoral, unethical) or
the positive traits of the target may be ignored, undervalued, or depreciated.
Victimization Bias: tendency to frame the self as a victim and to see the self as being exploited and taken
advantage of by powerful others (e.g., supervisor, government). Sets the stage for arguing that aggression
is acting out against tyranny, oppression, and injustice.
Social Discounting Bias: tendency to call on socially unorthodox and frequently antisocial beliefs to
interpret and to analyze social events and relationships. Individuals using this bias tend to be disdainful of
traditional beliefs and unfettered by social customs. They are directly cynical or critical with few
subliminal channels for routing antisocial framing and analyses.
Retribution Bias: tendency to confer logical priority to retaliation over reconciliation. Reflected in implicit
beliefs that aggression is warranted in order to restore respect or exact restitution for perceived wrongs.
This bias underlies classic rationalizations for aggression based on wounded pride and disrespect.
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biases to interpret people, situations, and events. Individuals who systematically rely on
a specific implicit cognitive bias when interpreting and analyzing situations may also use
this bias to further justify their aggressive responses to these situations. That is, habitual
reliance on a particular implicit cognitive bias (e. g., framing others as strong or weak) is
indicative of a justification mechanism (e.g., potency bias) that may be used to rationalize
the individual’s aggressive behavior. Whereas differential framing impacts how
aggressive individuals observe and interpret people, situations, and events, JMs move
beyond simple interpretation to include biases in causal inferences, reasoning, and the
justification of subsequent aggressive behavior. Thus, differential framing may be
thought of as the foundational content used to comprise the psychologically more
complex JMs.
James and Mazerolle (2002) describe how JMs directly shape the types of
reasoning strategies (i.e., processes) employed by an aggressive individual; exemplars of
these strategies are presented in Figure 1-1. To illustrate, consider someone with the JM
of hostile attribution bias. Such an individual might selectively attend to information that
 
indicates others should not be trusted. Furthermore, they may engage reasoning
strategies that seek to confirm this initial impression and thus justify aggressive behavior
against this untrustworthy person (they may also discount salient information and over
emphasize tertiary information).
JMs become the target of assessment in Conditional Reasoning Tests or CRTs
(James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al, 2001). Measurement of JMs is
accomplished indirectly by asking respondents to solve inductive reasoning problems.
An example of a Conditional Reasoning problem is presented in the lower portion of
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Figure 1-1. Each problem starts with a situation or scenario thought to be evocative to
aggressive individuals. In this example, a general situation emphasizing the exploitive
potential of powerful organizations was used as the evocative situation. From this
situation, an inductive reasoning problem was constructed. This problem asks
individuals to determine why 15 years ago Japanese automakers made superior
automobiles compared to American automakers. One solution is based on aggressive
reasoning associated with the JMs of “victimization by powerful others” and “hostile
attribution bias” (e. g., 15 years ago American automakers intentionally built poor cars so
they could make additional money on parts and repairs). This solution is designed to be
more logically appealing to aggressive individuals than the solution based on non-
aggressive (prosocial) reasoning (e.g., Japanese automakers knew more about building
good cars 15 years ago). For each item, respondents must decide if the non-aggressive
reasoning or the reasoning based on JMs is more logically persuasive.
James (1998) referred to this approach as Conditional Reasoning because what is
deemed as an appropriate solution to an inductive reasoning problem is conditional on the
personality of the respondent (e. g., aggressive or non-aggressive). That is, the reasoning
and inferences drawn depends on whether the reasoner is aggressive or non—aggressive.
To summarize how CRTs are constructed, inductive reasoning problems are created that
are evocative to one or more reasoning strategies typically employed by an aggressive
individual. These reasoning strategies are related to one or more JMs that are in turn,
related to a specific personality disposition or motive.
As stated earlier, James and Mazerolle (2002) reviewed a number of implicit
cognitive biases that are potentially related to JMs. These biases include attributional
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biases, illusory correlations, negative leniency, positive leniency, indirect compensation,
identification, discounting, leveling, and rationalization. These authors suggest that in
addition to measuring JMs engendered by these biases, measurement of these biases
could yield additional insights into an individual’s personality. Indeed, they suggest that
the cognitive bias underlying all JMs, differential framing, may be particularly promising 
for researchers interested in personality.
To recapitulate, framing is the process of" assigning “interpretative adjectives with
behaviors, people, situations, or events” (James & Mazerolle, 2002). Differential framing
occurs when individuals with different latent motives (e. g., aggression) frame the same
people, situations, or events in qualitatively different ways. James and Mazerolle (2002)
observe that,
Differences in framing are rapidly becoming one of the prominent
research topics in psychology. We suspect that the popularity of
this area will grow because differential framing opens that door to
a much more powerful measurement system, namely one based on
qualitative differences among individuals.
Thus, while framing represents a potentially powerful foundation for measuring
personality, to date no fully independent measurement system exists to capture these
qualitative differences in framing (James & Mazerolle, 2002). The purpose of the current
paper is to describe the development and initial validation of a new measurement system
designed to fill this research void. This new measurement system, derived from its parent
system Conditional Reasoning, is illustrated using the construct of dispositional
aggression. This measurement system seeks to complement the types of implicit
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cognitions measured by CRTs (i.e., justifications for aggressive behavior) with a related
type of implicit cognition (i.e., the initial biases in framing and perception). Stated
alternatively, the new approach seeks to measure the initial framing biases that become
the foundation for subsequent justification mechanisms.
Differential Framing
Differential Framing: Aggression
James has identified and summarized a number of framing proclivities associated
with aggressive individuals (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2001).
At the most general level, highly aggressive individuals tend to frame others through a
prism of strength versus weakness. Acts of aggression connote strength, bravery, and
assertiveness, whereas non-aggressive acts connote weakness, impotence, and fear.
Aggressive individuals may also implicitly frame the actions of others as hostile,
malicious, or malevolent. Finally, aggressive individuals frame others as deserving of
aggressive actions because they are evil, corrupt, dishonest, dysfunctional, immoral, or
untrustworthy. This is especially true ofpowerful others who aggressive individuals see
as exploitive, tyrannical, and antagonistic. These framing proclivities are imbedded
throughout the JMs presented earlier in Table 1-1.
Where traditional CRTs measure the biases in reasoning and causal inference, the
current paper describes a new test that simply measures the biases in initial implicit
framing. Because differences in framing are manifested in the adjectives people use to
describe situations, people, events, and other stimuli (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle,







Cognitive Bias: Differential Framing
0 Frame aggression as a display of strength
and bravery and non-aggression as
indicating weakness or fear
0 Frame powerfirl others as tyrannical and
exploitive.




















Pick the word that means most









    
Figure 1-2
General Overview of the Differential Framing Process for Aggression
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contains an overview of this measurement system as it is applied to dispositional
aggression.
Differential Framing Test (DFT)
The process of differential framing is subsumed under the more general process of
Conditional Reasoning. As such, comparison of Figures 1 and 2 reveals the process of
differential framing is less complex than the overall process of Conditional Reasoning.
The basic idea is that aggressive individuals tend to rely on unique biases in how they
frame their environments. These biases may be mapped into consciousness by examining
the adjectives they use to describe people, events, and situations. It is these adjectives
that become the foundation for measurement in differential framing tests. A synonym (or
word association) test represents one recommended approach to measuring these
differences in framing (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996) and was the
approach adopted in the current study.
Several sample items from this new test are presented in Table 1-2. The basic
idea is that a stimulus word is provided, followed by four possible synonyms.
Respondents are asked to choose from these four words the one that most closely matches
the meaning of the stimulus word. In truth, two of the responses represent potential
synonyms. One response is based on framing associated with aggressive personalities the
other is based on framing associated with non-aggressive or prosocial personalities.
Each item presented in Table 1-2 consists of four components. The first component
represents the stimulus word. Each stimulus word was designed to be evocative to
aggressive individuals. (Evocative meaning that each word was designed to “activate”
implicit framing associated with aggression.) The second component of each item
22
Table 1-2
Sample Items from the Differential Framing Test (DFT) for Aggression
 
STIMULUS Option 1 Option 2 Option3 Option4
TIMID Cowardly Shy Foolish Peaceful
COMMANDER Dictator Director Detective Dunce
TRUSTING Gullible Accepting Greedy Invisible
TO CONFORM To give up To adapt To ignore To quicken
23
comprising the Differential Framing Test (DFT) was the response option that would
specifically appeal to the framing proclivities of aggressive individuals. These options
are presented in column two of Table 1-2. These framing proclivities were extracted
from the descriptions of the JMs offered in Table 1-1. Specifically, each JM contains
some component of framing (in addition to other implicit cognitive biases) and it was this
framing that was used to facilitate the construction of the DFT items. For example, the
first item presented in Table 1-2 (and also in the lower portion of Figure 1-2) was based
on the framing associated with the potency bias JM, whereas the second item was based
on the framing associated with the JMs of hostile attribution bias and victimization by
powerful others bias.
The third component of each DFT item was the response option that would appeal
to framing proclivities of non—aggressive or prosocial individuals. The final component
was the inclusion of "wrong" answers or distractors. Just as the items on a synonym or
word association test measuring critical intellectual skills contain incorrect answers, so
too do the items on the DFT. The inclusion of incorrect responses enhances the face
validity of the measurement system and secures its circuitous nature (see James, 1998;
James et al., 2001). These distractors were specifically designed to appear as incorrect
options and thus should draw less than 5-10% of the responses on each item. That is,
roughly 90 to 95% of the responses to each item should be endorsements of one of the




This dissertation describes the development and initial validation of a new
measurement system designed to assess implicit cognitions associated with aggression.
This new measurement system was designed to compliment the types of cognitions
assessed by Conditional Reasoning. Specifically, CRTs measure a number of implicit
cognitive biases (including differential framing and other biases in reasoning and causal
inference) that are ultimately used to justify aggressive behavior. In contrast, the DFT
was designed to solely measure implicit cognitions associated differential framing. Thus,
the DFT was not designed to be redundant with the CRT; however, there will likely be
some overlap between the cognitions assessed by the CRT and DFT. As such, low to
moderate correlations are expected between these two tests (e. g., .208 or .305).
Additionally, because self-reports are designed to measure explicit cognitions, it
is expected that they will have near zero, and largely non-significant, correlations with
the implicit cognitions measured by the DFT and CRT (e. g., .00s to .10s). Finally,
because the DFT is measuring a general or global tendency to frame events, situations,
and people in an aggressive manner, it is expected to have significant correlations with a
general or global measure of aggressive behavior (i.e., student conduct violations).
Thus, this dissertation represents an initial demonstration study designed to
determine if the differential framing methodology was a Viable methodology for
measuring implicit cognitions and to determine how it would correlate with other
measures of aggression. The following research questions are addressed in the next three
chapters:
1. Could a methodology be developed to measure differential framing?
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2. If so, would the methodology be predictive of behavioral criteria?
3. If so, would the methodology be redundant with Conditional Reasoning?
Chapter 2 describes the development of this test along with the samples and
procedures used to collect data. Chapter 3 contains validity and reliability analyses on
the DFT. Finally, Chapter 4 recapitulates the findings from Chapter 3, identifies potential




Data were collected on two slightly different versions of the Differential Framing
Test (DFT). Data on the first version (DFT-V1) were collected during the Fall 2000 term
from an introductory course in management information systems. Several minor changes
were made to the original version and then data were collected on a second version
(DFT-V2) from students enrolled in this same course during the Spring 2001 term.
Finally, test-retest data were collected from a course in human resource management
during the Fall 2001 term on DFT-V2. The descriptions of the participants, methods, and
surveys used in this dissertation are divided into those who completed the original survey
and those who completed the slightly modified survey. A similar division is made in
Chapter 3 when discussing the results of this dissertation. A summary of the participants
is presented in Table 2-1.
DFT Version 1
Participants
Data for Sample 1 and Sample 2 were collected from students in a large
undergraduate course in management information systems (N = 423). This class was
randomly split into two samples (Sample 1, N = 212; Sample 2, N = 211). A double
cross-validation design was employed to provide criterion-related validity evidence
(Binning & Barrett, 1989; James, 1973) for the DFT. That is, the empirical key
developed for the DFT using Sample 1 was cross-validated in Sample 2, and vice versa.
Table 2-1
Summary of Study Participants
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Sample Term N Scale Class
Sample 1 Fall, 2000 212 DFT-V1 Intro. to Mgmt. Information Systems
Sample 2 Fall, 2000 211 DFT-V1 Intro. to Mgmt. Information Systems
Sample 3 Spring, 2001 217 DFT-V2 Intro. to Mgmt. Information Systems
Sample 4 Fall, 2001 48 DFT-V2 Human Resource Management
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Sample 1. A total of 212 undergraduates from a large Southeastern university
comprised this sample. Students were provided with extra credit in exchange for their
participation. The majority of participants were White (92%) and male (55%). All
participants used in this dissertation were treated in accordance with the APA Ethical
Guidelines (American Psychological Association, 1992).
Sample 2. A total of 211 undergraduates from a large Southeastern university
comprised this sample. Students were provided with extra credit in exchange for their
participation. The majority of participants were White (87%) and female (53%).
Data Collection Procedures
Participants were asked to complete a number of different measures at the
beginning or end of multiple class periods during the semester. When possible, the
surveys were administered separately so as to avoid potential context and cueing effects
(Council, 1993; Harrison, McLaughlin, & Coalter, 1996) as well as to reduce potential
percept-percept inflation among self-report surveys (Crampton & Wagner, 1994;
Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This resulted in a total of six
independent waves of data collection. Three of the six waves of data collection were
used in this dissertation. Surveys collected at different points in the semester were
matched using student identification numbers. Once all data were collected and matched
to each participant, information on the identification numbers was removed from the data
files.
Measures
Differential Framing Test (DFT-V1). This dissertation involved measuring
 
implicit framing associated with dispositional aggression. The first version of this test
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consisted of 41 items. The items were structured as a synonym test. Specifically, a
stimulus word was provided, followed by four possible answers. Respondents were
instructed to choose from these words the one that most closely matched the meaning of
the stimulus word.
The DFT was developed theoretically based on earlier work by James and
colleagues (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996). An
original list of 10 synonyms presented by James & Mazerolle (2002) was expanded by
the author to approximately 30 synonyms. This expanded list was then reviewed by his
advisor, another faculty member, and two graduate students all of whose primary
research involved measuring implicit social cognitions (in general) and use of the
Conditional Reasoning methodology (in particular). These subject matter experts
provided comments, criticisms, and suggestions regarding earlier drafts of the synonym
test. They also helped generate a number of additional synonyms. After several
iterations of comments and revisions an initial test of 41 synonyms was constructed. This
test is formally designated DFT-V1. Sample items were presented in Table 1-1 in
Chapter 1.
As stated in Chapter 1, in order to assess implicit cognitions, indirect
measurement systems are needed. The DFT represents such a measurement system
because it neither “informs the subject of what is being assessed nor requests self-report
concerning it” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; p. 5). In order to further maintain the
circuitous nature of assessment, a coversheet was included with the DFT. This
coversheet asked about the participants’ interests in solving word problems, the number
of English or writing courses they had taken during college, and their scores on the verbal
30
sections of the ACT and SAT. By directing participants’ thoughts towards verbal
hobbies and abilities, the likelihood that participants would associate the DFT with any
type of personality-related survey should have been reduced. To further maintain the
indirect nature of assessment, data on the DFT were collected independent of additional
measures (e. g., self-reports of aggression).
The DFT-V1 contained roughly twenty synonyms designed to measure implicit
framing associated with dispositional aggression. The remaining twenty synonyms were
exploratory in nature and were designed to measure framing associated with other
constructs (e.g., fear of failure, depression). These extra items were included 1) to reduce
the transparency of the DFT (i.e., so that every item was not trying to measure aggressive
framing) and 2) to gather preliminary data on items that could be used to assess these
constructs in future research efforts (see Chapter 4).
Self—Report Aggression Scale. Self-reported aggression was measured using the
20-item scale from the Jackson Personality Research Form (1984). This scale assesses
explicit cognitions associated with the non-pathological personality dimension of
aggression. Participants were asked to respond to items using a 5-point Likert-like scale
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Sample items include “I have a violent
temper” and “I seldom feel like hitting anyone” (reverse keyed).
Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression (CRT-A). The CRT-A consists of 22
inductive reasoning problems that are designed to assess implicit cognitive readiness to
engage in aggressive behaviors (James, 1998; James et al., 2001). Answers to these
problems are derived from the justification mechanisms (JMs) for aggression described in
Chapter 1. Items are scored such that a +1 is given for each response based on a JM for
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aggression and 0 is given for all other responses (i.e., socially adaptive responses and
distracter responses). The resulting number provides an index of implicit cognitive
readiness to engage in aggressive behavior. The potential range of this scale is from 0 to
+22, with higher scores indicating a greater propensity to engage in aggressive behaviors.
In addition to the overall index of readiness to aggress, scale scores were
computed based on earlier factor analyses (James at al., 2001). Scores were computed
for the following subscales: antisocial reasoning bias (ASR), potency bias (PB), hostile
attribution bias (HAB), victimization by powerful others bias (VBP), and retribution bias
(RB). The interested reader is referred to James (1998) and James et al. for additional
information concerning this test.
Conduct Violations. Records of student misconduct were collected from the
University registrar. These conduct violations were issued for a wide range of behaviors
including plagiarism, theft, public drunkenness, possession of illegal drugs, physical
assault, forgery, vandalism, and cheating. The registrar does not code for the specific
violation, only if a violation had occurred. Thus, this variable was dichotomously scored
such that individuals having engaged in a conduct violation were assigned a value of +1
and those without conduct violations were assigned a value of 0. These data were used as
behavioral indicators of aggression in the criterion-related validity analyses described in
the next chapter (see also Green, 1999).
It is critical to note that the conduct violation criterion is not a perfect criterion.
Violations, like so many criteria used in applied psychology, are at least partially
deficient and contaminated. It is likely that many of the individuals who earned conduct
violations did so by behaving aggressively. In this instance, keying items against conduct
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violations would be appropriate because it represents a “pure” aggression criterion.
However, it is equally likely that a number of individuals earned conduct violations for
reasons n_ot associated with aggression. In this instance, keying items against conduct
Violations would be inappropriate because individuals earned these violations for non-
aggressive reasons. At this early stage of development, I was seeking to test a
correlational, not a causal model. I simply hoped to identify a criterion variable that
would be (at least partially) predicted by aggressive framing.
Similar logic was used during the initial validation efforts of the CRT-A. For
example, absenteeism and job performance were used as criteria in early validation
studies (James, 1998; James et al. 2001). However, just because an individual is absent
(or performs poorly) doesn’t mean he or she is aggressive. An individual might be absent
because they are sick or had a family conflict. Or, an individual might be a poor
performer because they lack the necessary skills and abilities to perform effectively. On
the other hand, an individual may be absent or perform poorly because they are acting in
a passive-aggressive manner towards a powerful other (organization) that they View as
tyrannical and exploitive. Thus, in the current study, the conduct violation criterion
represents a fairly vague criterion that may be engendered by a number of different
causes. Aggression may be one such cause.
The proportion of men and women with conduct violations is presented in Table
2-2. Chi-square tests indicated that the proportion of men with violations was
significantly greater than the proportion ofwomen with violations in Sample 1 (x2 =




Number of Male and Female Participants with Conduct Violations
 
Sample With a Violation Without a Violation
Sample 1 Males 23 92
Females 2 93
Sample 2 Males 5 95
Females 3 108
Sample 3 Males 5 88
Females 1 1 1 13
 
34
Composite Key Development 
DFT items were empirically keyed against the aggression criterion of conduct
violations. Each aggressive response was scored as +1, each non-aggressive response
was scored as -l, and each distractor response was scored as 0. These item-scoring
protocols are consistent the protocols used during the early validation efforts of
Conditional Reasoning tests (James, 1998; James et al., 2001). Polychoric correlations
were computed between each DFT item and the behavior conduct criterion. Polychoric
correlations were deemed the appropriate statistic because both the criterion and the
predictors were categorical indicators of continuous latent constructs.
Any theoretically appropriate item correlating with the criterion .30 or greater was
retained for inclusion in a composite scale. Following these initial item analyses,
composite scores were computed within Sample 1 and Sample 2. These scores were then
cross-validated in the appropriate holdout sample. Thus, a double cross-validation design
was utilized, yielding two initial validities and two cross-validities. All results are
presented in Chapter 3.
Though some authors have cautioned against the use of empirical keys in test
development (e. g., Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), the approach was deemed reasonable
for three primary reasons:
1. The initial item pool was based on the professional judgments of five
individuals with experience in item development and validation (especially
with tests measuring implicit social cognitions). Furthermore, though the final
keys were empirically developed, the initial item pool was based on
theoretically driven items. 
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2. This approach is consistent with the discussion of construct validity presented
in James (1973) and Binning and Barrett (1989). To recapitulate, one of the
best ways to generate construct validity evidence for a test (e.g., implicit
aggressive framing) is to correlate it with an external criterion (e. g., conduct
violations) from the broader construct domain (e.g., aggression). See also the
approaches utilized by James (1998) and James et a1. (2001) and the
discussion by Ozer (1999) of validity and construct validation in personality
research.
3. A major limitation of the empirical approach to item validation is the
possibility of capitalizing on sampling error. In the current study, large
samples (N > 150) and a double-cross-validation design were utilized to
specifically overcome this potential limitation. Additionally, only
theoretically appropriate items correlating with the criterion would be
included. Thus, if one of the extra synonyms designed to measure some other
construct (e. g., depression) correlated with conduct violations, this item would
n_ot be included in the aggression composite score. Fortunately, such
theoretically “spurious” correlations rarely emerged in the analyses. Finally,





Sample 3. A total of 217 undergraduates from a large Southeastern university
comprised this sample. Students were provided with extra credit in exchange for their
participation. The majority of participants were White (90%) and female (57%).
Sample 4. A total of 48 undergraduates from a Midwestern university comprised
this sample. Students were provided with extra credit in exchange for their participation.
Specific data were not collected on the race or gender of the participants. However, at
this University students were equally divided between males and females and
predominately White. Most students were at least in their junior year of college.
Data Collection Procedures 
Participants comprising Sample 3 were asked to complete the CRT-A and the
DFT on different days during the Spring 2001 semester. A total of 151 participants
completed the CRT-A and 130 participants completed the DFT-V2. The DFT data were
scored using the a priori keys developed in Samples 1 and 2.
Participants in Sample 4 were asked to complete the DFT during the middle of the
semester and again three weeks later. Participants were assigned a three-digit personal
identification number to be used to link Time 1 and Time 2 test administrations. A total
of 58 students completed a survey at either Time 1 or Time 2; however, only 48
participants completed the survey at both times. Thus, because the data from Sample 4
were used solely for test-retest reliability analyses, the effective sample size was 48.
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Measures
Differential Framing Test Version 2 (DFT-V2). The DFT-V1 was slightly revised
prior to collecting data from Samples 3 and 4. Specifically, a number of “real” synonyms
were added to the beginning of the DFT. The addition of these synonyms was done in
order to further secure the indirect nature of assessment and is consistent with the
methods used by James (1998) and James et al. (2001). Additionally, several items were
dropped and several new items were included. This resulted in a revised test containing a
total of 51 items.
Additional Measures. In Sample 3, data were also collected on the CRT-A and
conduct violations. As stated earlier, Sample 4 was being used solely to compute test-






Sample 1. As stated in Chapter 2, any theoretically appropriate DFT item
correlating .30 or greater with the criterion was retained for inclusion in the composite
key. Using these scoring protocols, five aggression items keyed empirically against the
conduct violation criterion. A unit-weighted composite scale was created for these items
and is designated Key 1. The initial validity between this composite and the criterion was
.45.
Sample 2. Using the above scoring procedures, eight aggression items keyed
empirically against the conduct violation criterion in Sample 2. A unit-weighted
composite scale was created for these items and is designated Key 2. The initial validity
between this composite and the criterion was .74.
Key Cross-Validation 
The keys initially developed in each sample were then cross-validated in the
appropriate hold-out sample. The aggression key developed in Sample 1 had a cross-
validity of .34 while the key developed in Sample 2 had a cross-validity of .51. This
yielded an average cross-validity of .43 (see Table 3-1). The magnitude of these cross-
validities indicated that many of the items contained in both keys were highly predictive
Table 3-1
Initial- and Cross-Validities for the DFT-V1
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Sample 1 Sample 2
Key Key
Sample 1 Data .45 .34
Sample 2 Data .51 .74
Note. Correlations are based on N=17l and N=170 for Samples 1 and 2, respectively.
Cross-validities are in boldface.
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of the conduct violation criterion and not necessarily a function of random chance or
sampling error. Table 3-2 contains the 20 aggression framing items and a summary of
which items keyed in Sample 1 (Key 1), Sample 2 (Key2), or both samples. As this table
indicates, a total of nine items keyed between Samples 1 and 2, with four of those items
keying in both samples. Table 3-3 compares the mean scores on the CRT-A, Key 1, and
Key 2 for individuals having a conduct violation versus those not having a conduct
violation. These results suggest that individuals with conduct violations tended to have
significantly higher scores on the DFT but not the CRT-A.
Supplemental Validity Evidence
The strongest form of construct validity evidence is fumished by correlating the
DFT with a known behavioral indicator of aggression such as conduct violations
(Binning & Barrett, 1989; James, 1973; Ozer, 1999; Schmitt & Landy, 1993). Such
evidence was presented in the preceding section, however secondary construct validity
evidence was also sought by examining the correlations between the DFT and other
measures of aggression. Because the DFT was designed to measure implicit framing
cognitions associated with aggression, it was expected to have low to moderate
correlations with the implicit cognitions measured using the CRT-A (i.e., justification
mechanisms). Alternatively, near zero correlations were expected between the DFT and
measures of explicit cognitions (cf. Bing et al., 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James,
1998; James, et al., 2001; Lilienfeld, et al., 2000; McClelland et al., 1989; Winter et a1.
1998)
Secondary construct validity evidence is presented in Table 3-4 for Sample 1 and
Table 3-5 for Sample 2. As expected, non-significant correlations between the DFT and
Table 3-2
Summary of Differential Framirpg Items Keyipg in Samples 1 and 2
 
Stimulus Aggressive Non-Aggressive Sample 1 Sample 2
Word Frame Frame Key Key
TO CRITIQUE To Criticize To Evaluate No No
CAUTIOUS Timid Careful No Yes
TO MISLEAD To Deceive To Misinform No No
COMMANDER Dictator Director No No
TO RETREAT To Flee To Pull Back No No
TRADITIONAL Unprogressive Conventional Yes Yes
TRUSTING Gullible Accepting Yes No
TO SUPERVISE To Control To Oversee No No
PASSIVE Submissive Inactive No Yes
PATHETIC Weak Sad No No
TO CONFORM To Give up To Adapt Yes Yes
UNUSUAL Strange Uncommon No Yes
RELUCTANT Unwilling Hesitant Yes Yes
COMPETITIVE Cut-throat Ambitious No Yes
TO DOUBT To Distrust To Question No No
A COMPROMISE A Concession An Agreement No No
CONFLICT Hostility Disharmony No No
DISCIPLINE Control Order No No
SUBMISSIVE Obedient Passive No No








Sample Scale Violation Violation t-test
Sample 1 CRT-A 4.06 3.59 -0.94
Key 1 -2.90 -4.25 -3.83*
Key 2 -3.20 -4.74 -3.03*
Sample 2 CRT-A 3.20 3.61 0.44
Key 1 -2.86 -4.31 -3.27*
Key 2 -1.29 -4.94 -5.04*
Sample 3 CRT-A 3.08 3.60 0.90
Key 1 -3.67 -4.37 -1.39




Supplemental Validity Evidence: Sample 1
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Conduct -—
2. CRT-A 0.13 0.70
3. CRT-ASR 0.24* 0.77* .79
4. CRT-VBP 0.12 0.49* 0.24* .78
5. CRT-RB 0.07 0.62* 0.12 0.35* .74
6. CRT-HAB -0.06 0.15 -0.13 0.16* 0.07 .73
7. CRT-PB -0.07 0.45* 0.16* -0. 19* 0.04 0.11 .85
8. PRF-A 0.25* 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.04 .81
9. Key-1 0.45* 022* 0.23* 0.09 020* -0.08 0.11 0.08 --
10. Key-2 0.34* -0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.69* --
 
Note. Conduct=Conduct Violations; CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; CRT-ASR =
antisocial reasoning subscale of CRT-A; CRT-VBP = victimization by powerful others subscale of CRT-A;
CRT-RB = retribution bias subscale of CRT-A; CRT-HAB = hostile attribution bias of CRT-A; CRT-PB =
potency bias subscale of CRT-A; PRF-A = Aggression scale from the Jackson Personality Research Form;
Key-1 = DFT score based on the key developed in Sample 1; Key-2 = DFT score based on the key
developed in Sample 2. Correlations are based on sample sizes ranging from 130 to 172. Internal




Supplemental Validity Evidence: Sample 2
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Conduct --
2. CRT-A -0.10 0.73
3. CRT-ASR -0.02 0.81* 0.75
4. CRT-VBP 024* 0.34* 0.04 0.79
5. CRT-RB -0.20* 0.71* 0.37* 023* 0.84
6. CRT-HAB -0.08 -0.02 -0.30* 023* -0.01 0.75
7. CRT-PB -0.91* 0.62* 0.45* -0.21* 023* -0.01 0.84
8. PRF—A -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.18* 0.02 021* 0.09 .76
9. Key-1 0.51* 0.06 -0.06 0.14 0.17* 025* 0.11 -0.07 --
10. Key-2 0.74* -0.09 -0.11 0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.54* --
 
mConduct=Conduct Violations; CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; CRT-ASR =
antisocial reasoning subscale of CRT-A; CRT-VBP = victimization by powerful others subscale of CRT-A;
CRT-RB = retribution bias subscale of CRT-A; CRT-HAB = hostile attribution bias of CRT-A; CRT-PB =
potency bias subscale of CRT-A; PRF-A = Aggression scale from the Jackson Personality Research Form;
KEY-l = DFT score based on the key developed in Sample 1; KEY-2 = DFT score based on the key
developed in Sample 2. Correlations are based on sample sizes ranging from 121 to 170. Internal
consistency reliability estimates are presented in the diagonal.
*p<.05
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self-reported aggression were obtained in both samples using both keys. This replicated
earlier research on the relationship between implicit and explicit cognitions and
suggested that the types of implicit cognitions being measured by the DFT are not
correlated with the types of explicit cognitions being measured by the self-report
aggression scale (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2001).
Somewhat inconsistent results emerged for the correlations between the DFT and
the CRT-A. The expected small (but significant) correlation between the CRT-A and
Key 1 was observed in Sample 1 (r = .22), but not in Sample 2. However, after
computing scores for the subscales identified by James et al. (2001), several additional
correlations emerged in both samples. In Sample 1, Key 1 correlated with the subscales
for antisocial reasoning (r = .23), and retribution bias (r = .20). In Sample 2, Key 1
correlated with the subscales for retribution bias (r = .17) and hostile attribution bias (r =
.25). No significant correlations emerged between Key 2 and the CRT-A in either
sample.
At first glance these low correlations could be perceived as potentially damaging
to the construct validity of the DFT; however, remember that the DFT was not designed
to be redundant with the CRT. Rather, the DFT was designed to measure only a small
component of the family of implicit cognitions also measured by the CRT-A. That is, the
DFT was limited to measuring differential framing, whereas the CRT-A measured
differential framing along with a number of other cognitive biases (e. g., attributional
biases, rationalizations). Thus, the low to moderate correlations between the DFT and the
CRT-A indicate that the DFT is measuring an aspect of implicit cognitions that is related
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to, but not necessarily redundant with those measured by the CRT-A (see also the results
obtained by Thoreck, 1994 using similar methods for assessing achievement motivation).
Additionally, this is the first study to undertake a formal examination of the
relationships between the JMs measured by the CRT-A and differential framing
measured by the DFT. As such, this dissertation is most appropriately framed as an
exploratory study into relatively uncharted scientific territory. Additional research is
obviously needed to better understand the relationship between differential framing and
the justification mechanisms measured by the CRT-A. Nevertheless, slightly higher and
more consistent correlations would have allowed a more substantive link between these
two sets of implicit cognitions. The issue of obtaining additional validity evidence
linking differential framing to Conditional Reasoning is revisited in Chapter 4.
A peculiar finding in both samples was the lack of substantial correlation between
the CRT and the conduct violation criterion. Past research has shown the CR
methodology can be predictive of this particular criterion. Specifically, a dissertation by
Green (1999) demonstrated that a 14-item developmental verbal-visual CRT or V-CRT
significantly correlated with this student conduct violation criterion. Twelve of the 14 V-
CRT items correspond to items found on the current CRT-A. Of these 12 items, five
loaded on the antisocial reasoning subscale and four loaded on the victimization by
powerful others subscale. Thus, one might expect these factors to have higher
correlations with the criterion compared to the overall CRT-A score or the other scale
scores. Examination of Tables 3-4 and 3-5 show this expectation holds. Specifically, in
Sample 1, the correlation between conduct violations and the antisocial reasoning
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subscale was .24. In Sample 2, the correlation between conduct violations and the
victimization by powerful others subscale was .24.
All the same, these correlations are still lower than past findings using the
developmental V-CRT. Several possible explanations exist for the lower observed
correlations. First, the magnitude of these correlations could be attributed to differences
between the V-CRT and the CRT-A (i.e., fewer distractors, reduced item complexity,
supplemental verbal-visual instructions). This is unlikely, however because previous
research indicates these measures are highly correlated (r = .82). A second possibility for
the lower correlations is that there was something atypical about scores on the CRT-A
compared to previous samples. Table 3-6 contains the distributional characteristics for
the CRT-A, DFT, and the conduct violation criterion.
The means and standard deviations reported for the CRT-A in Samples 1 and 2
were consistent with previous research (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2001).
However, unlike previous research only Sample 2 demonstrated the significant positive
skew (Sample 1, t(164) = 1.58, p > .05; Sample 2, t(150) = 2.74, p < .05) and neither
sample demonstrated the typical leptokurtotic distribution (Sample 1, t(164) = -0.77, p >
.05; Sample 2, t(150) = 0.61, p > .05). Thus, one viable explanation for the lack of
correlation between the CRT and the conduct violation criterion were the gross
differences observed in the marginal distributions.
High correlations may only occur under conditions of marginal distribution
congruence. In Sample 1 only 12% of the participants had recorded conduct violations
and in Sample 2 this number dropped to 4%. This resulted in distributions that were
highly skewed (Sample 1, t(209)= 13.94, p < .05; Sample 2, t (209) = 28.65, p < .05) and
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Table 3-6
Comparison of the Distributions of CRT-A, DFT, and Conduct Violations
 
Sample N Mean St.Dev. Skew (st.error) Kurtosis (st. error)
Sample 1
Conduct 210 .12 .33 2.37 (.17) 3.65 (.33)
CRT-A 165 3.64 2.00 .30 (.19) -.29 (.38)
KEY 1 172 -4.09 1.53 1.98 (.19) 4.75 (.37)
KEY 2 172 -4.57 2.19 .38 (.19) -24 (.37)
Sample 2
Conduct 210 .04 .19 4.87 (.17) 21.96 (.33)
CRT-A 151 3.60 2.05 .54 (.20) .24 (.39)
KEY-1 170 -4.25 1.19 1.58 (.19) 2.29 (.37)
KEY-2 170 -4.79 2.01 .41 (.19) .39 (.37)
Sample 3
Conduct 217 .07 .26 3.29 (.17) 8.87 (.33)
CRT-A 151 3.56 2.02 .66 (.20) .42 (.39)
KEY-l 130 —4.34 1.22 1.83 (.21) 2.67 (.42)
KEY-2 130 -4.58 2.11 .69 (.21) .93 (.42)
 
Note. Conduct=Conduct Violations; CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; KEY-1
= DFT score based on the key developed in Sample 1; KEY-2 = DFT score based on the key
developed in Sample 2. Because conduct violations are dichotomously scored, the means
correspond to the proportion of individuals having a registered conduct violation.
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kurtotic (Sample 1, t (209) = 11.06, p < .05; Sample 2, t (209) =66.55, p < .05). Given
that the DFT was specifically designed to predict this highly skewed and kurtotic
criterion (and thus itself was significantly skewed [Keys 1 and 2 were skewed in both
samples] and kurtotic [Key 1 was kurtotic in both samples]) it is not surprising that the
correlations between the CRT and the DFT were also slightly lower than expected.
A third, and final explanation resides in the match between the predictor and the
criterion. Previous (unpublished) attempts by the author to replicate Green (1999) using
the CRT-A and samples independent of the current study have not been highly
successful. One explanation for this inability to replicate the correlations derives from
the very general nature of the criterion. Conduct violations are assigned for any number
of different behaviors ranging from lesser to extreme forms of aggression and antisocial
behavior. Thus, a measure designed to assess specific rationalizations (driven largely by
antisocial reasoning; James et al., 2001) would correlate with the conduct violation
criterion only to the extent that individuals earned those violations for engaging in
extremely aggressive/antisocial behaviors versus less antisocial behaviors.
It is possible that Green’s (1999) sample simply contained a greater proportion of
individuals who earned violations for engaging in extremely antisocial forms of behavior.
If similar proportions of antisocial behavior were not present in subsequent samples,
correlations between the CRT-A and conduct violations would be lower. If data were
available on the specific behaviors that resulted in the conduct violation, it might be
possible to construct criterion composites that would be better predicted by the CRT-A or
its specific subfactors (e. g., antisocial reasoning). Unfortunately, in the current study,
such data were not available.
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In sum, the lack of observed correlations between the CRT-A and DFT, and the
CRT-A and the criterion are potentially attributable to differences in the marginal
distributions among the variables, the potential lack of extreme antisocial behaviors
comprising the criterion space, or real differences in the overlap of the construct domains
measured by differential framing and Conditional Reasoning. Chapter 4 discusses
potential avenues for future research concerning the latter point.
One other unexpected finding worth mentioning was the exceptionally high (and
negative) correlation between the potency bias subscale and the conduct violation
criterion (r = -.91) observed in Sample 2 (see Table 3-5). Complete data were available
for 151 individuals on both the CRT-A and the conduct violation criterion. Of these 151
individuals five had conduct violations and none of these individuals endorsed a single
CRT item loading on the potency bias subscale. However, other individuals without
conduct violations did endorse items loading on the potency bias subscale. Thus, the
high correlation is an accurate depiction of the relationship between the criterion and the
potency bias subscale and not necessarily due to instabilities in the algorithms used to
compute the polychoric correlations. However, given that this correlation did not
replicate in either Sample 1 or Sample 3 (or in other unpublished samples examined by
the author) it is likely more an effect of sampling error than a meaningful psychological
phenomena.
Reliability of the DFT 
Internal consistency reliability was estimated using a derivative of the KR-20
formula (see James et al., 2001). This formula, presented below, computes internal





Where K refers to the number of items, sg2 refers to the variance of the items and
(1)
  
rgsg refers to the product of the item-total polyserial and the standard deviation of the
item. Following James et al. (2001), standardized variables were assumed, thus variances





Using Equation 2, reliabilities were estimated for both keys in both samples. The
  
results presented in Table 3-7 suggest high levels of internal consistency reliability.
Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) suggest the lower bound reliability for tests in the early
stages of development should be at least .70. All of the estimates presented in Table 3-7
exceeded this threshold, indicating modest to strong levels of internal consistency.
DFT Version 2
Validity and Reliability of the DFT: Sample 3
Internal Consistency Reliability Analysis. Internal consistency reliability was
again estimated using Equation 2 on the data collected in Sample 3. In addition to Keys 1
and 2, additional keys were developed based on the results obtained in Samples 1 and 2.
Key 3 contained the four items found in both Key 1 and Key 2 (i.e., the intersection of
these two keys; Hays, 1988). The final key, Key 4 contained the nine items found in
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Table 3-7
Internal Consistency Reliability of the DFT
 
Sample 1 Sample 2
Key Key
Sample 1 Data .88 .77
Sample 2 Data .84 .73
Note. Coefficients based on N’s ranging from 168 to 172 and N’s ranging from 169 to
170 for Sample 1 and Sample 2 respectively.
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either Key 1 or Key 2 (i.e., the union of these two keys; Hays, 1988). These keys were
also used in the validation analyses presented below. The results of the reliability
analyses are presented in Table 3-8. All estimates of internal consistency reliability
exceeded the recommended lower bound of .70 (Nunnally, 1978) suggesting anywhere
from modest to strong reliability.
Criterion-Related Validity Analyses. Data from Sample 3 were scored using the
four a priori keys developed in Samples 1 and 2. Table 3-9 contains the validities
between these four keys and the conduct violation criterion. The magnitude of these four
validities (Mean = .39) provides further evidence that the implicit framing items were
related to manifestations of aggressive behavior and not a function of sampling error.
Supplemental Validity Evidence: Sample 3
In addition to the validity evidence presented above, secondary evidence was
again sought by examining the correlations between the DFT and the CRT-A. These
results were similar to those obtained in Samples 1 and 2 (see Table 3-10). Specifically,
non-significant correlations were obtained between scores on the CRT-A and DFT.
However, small to moderate correlations were again obtained between the DFT keys and
the retribution bias subscale from the CRT-A. Specifically, the retribution bias subscale
correlated with Keys 1, 2, 3, and 4 with values of .27, .23, .29, and .24, respectively.
These results replicate those presented earlier suggesting that implicit cognitions
measured by the DFT do overlap slightly with those measured by the retribution bias JM
on the CRT-A. However, the degree of overlap indicates that the implicit cognitions





Reliability of the DFT
Sample 3a Sample 4b
Key Internal Consistency Test-Retest
Key 1 (Sample 1) .87 .77
Key 2 (Sample 2) .74 .68
Key 3 (Intersection of Keys 1 & 2) .87 .81
Key 4 (Union of Keys 1 & 2) .77 .69
 
3 Correlations based on samples sizes ranging from 129 to 130.
b Correlations based on sample size of 48.
Table 3-9





Key 1 (Sample 1) .33
Key 2 (Sample 2) .42
Key 3 (Intersection of Keys 1 & 2) .39
Key 4 (Union of Keys 1 & 2) .43 
a Correlations based on sample size of 130.
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Table 3-10
Supplemental Validity Analyses: Sample 3
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Conduct --
2. CRT-A -0.11 0.72
3. CRT-ASR -0.09 0.82* 0.73
4. CRT-VBP 0.05 0.45* 025* 0.86
5. CRT-RB -0.10 0.67* 0.30* 025* 0.82
6. CRT-HAB 0.08 -0.04 -0.32 0.14 -0.01 0.78
7. CRT-PB -0.l8* 0.54* 0.35* -0.24* 027* -0.18* 0.79
8. Key-1 033* 0.11 -0.04 0.10 027* 0.11 -0.15 --
9. Key-2 0.42* 0.09 -0.04 0.17 023* 0.08 -0.01 0.60* --
10. Key-3 0.39* 0.06 -0.07 0.17 029* 0.03 -0.20* 0.97* 0.74* --
ll.Key-4 0.43* 0.12 -0.02 0.16 024* 0.11 -0.01 0.78* 0.99* 0.75* --
 
mConduct=Conduct Violations; CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; CRT-ASR =
antisocial reasoning subscale of CRT-A; CRT-VBP = victimization by powerfiJl others subscale of CRT-A;
CRT-RB = retribution bias subscale of CRT-A; CRT-HAB = hostile attribution bias of CRT-A; CRT-PB =
potency bias subscale of CRT-A; Key 1 = DFT score based on the key developed in Sample 1; Key 2 =
DFT score based on the key developed in Sample 2; Key 3 = intersection of Key 1 and Key 2; Key 4 =
union of Key land Key 2. Correlations are based on sample sizes ranging from 105 to 151. Internal
consistency reliability estimates are presented in the diagonal.
*p<.05
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As an aside, the lack of correlation between the CRT-A and the conduct violation
criterion may again be related to the marginal distributions of these two variables.
Specifically, only 8% of the participants in Sample 3 had a conduct violation (see Table
3-6), resulting in a highly skewed (p < .05) and kurtotic (p < .05) distribution. Though
the CRT-A was significantly skewed (p < .05) it again was not kurtotic (p > .05). Thus,
in Samples 1, 2, and 3, the distribution on the CRT-A was quasi-normal, making it
difficult for significant correlations to emerge between the CRT—A and the conduct
violation criterion which was grossly non-normal.
Reliability of the DFT: Sample 4
Test-Retest Reliability. In order to compute test-retest reliability, the four keys
 
described above where computed for data collected at Time 1 and three weeks later at
Time 2 from participants comprising Sample 4. The Time 1 keys were then correlated
with the Time 2 keys to yield test-retest reliabilities coefficients. Using .70 as a
minimum reliability threshold (Nunnally, 1978), the results presented earlier in Table 3-8




Validity and Reliability of the Differential Framing Methodology
Reliability
The data collected and analyzed from four samples indicated moderate to high
levels of test reliability. Specifically, internal consistency reliability estimates in three
samples met or exceeded the recommended lower bound reliability thresholds for tests in
the early stages of development (Nunnally, 1978). Additionally, data collected from a
fourth sample demonstrated moderate levels of test-retest reliability after a three-week
interval. Overall, these results suggest the differential framing methodology is applicable
to the reliable and consistent measurement of implicit social cognitions.
Yam—fix
Ozer (1999) noted, “Validity is the sine qua non of personality assessment” (p.
678). Based on the results presented in Chapter 3 the initial validation efforts for the
differential framing methodology have been fairly successful, given its early stage of
development. Specifically, the methodology demonstrated substantial predictive
validities and cross-validities in three different samples. Additionally, the expected low
correlations between differential framing and self-reports emerged. Though significant
correlations between differential framing and Conditional Reasoning did emerge, they
were slightly lower and less consistent than anticipated. This may be taken as evidence
that differential framing is measuring implicit cognitions related to, but not redundant
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with, the implicit cognitions measured by Conditional Reasoning. It is important to note
that the manner in which the DFT items were scored resulted in a distribution on the DFT
that was not congruent with the CRT, perhaps attenuating a number of correlations. This
issue is revisited below.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One of the primary limitations of the current study resides in the use of a single
(and less than optimal) criterion measure. Before it can be concluded that aggressive
cognitions measured via the differential framing relate to subsequent aggressive behavior,
additional validation studies must be undertaken to examine if the items and keys
developed in the current samples are predictive in other (non-student) samples using
alternative indicators of aggression. Now that the differential framing methodology has
shown some progress, the next phase of research should involve validation of items
against more precise indices of aggression. Buss’ (1961) taxonomy of aggressive
behaviors offers a rich framework from which to draw criteria for use in laboratory
experiments that will permit more precise analyses of these framing cognitions. As the
domain of criteria predicted by the differential framing methodology increases, so too
will the construct validity evidence for the methodology. One particular issue in need of
additional research is whether framing, like Conditional Reasoning, can be predictive of
specific criteria such as theft, lying, and physical assault. Or, on the other hand, is
differential framing better suited to predict more general (i.e., heterogeneous) criteria?
A second, but related limitation of the current study relates to the inconsistent
correlations observed between the differential framing scales and the CRT-A. Though
the mean and variance of the CRT-A were consistent with past research, the distribution
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of scores in the current studies lacked a strong positive skew and leptokurtic structure.
Indeed, the CRT-A was quasi-normally distributed, making it nearly impossible for
higher correlations to emerge with both the framing scales and the criterion (both of
which were grossly skewed and kurtotic).
Also worth noting, the current differential framing items were written in an
attempt to measure a wide range of framing cognitions. Because the differential framing
methodology appears to be a viable approach for measuring implicit cognitions, future
research might benefit from the construction of subscales designed to assess the implicit
cognitions corresponding to the framing contained in the individual JMs comprising the
CRT-A. For example, attempts could be made to build subscales (e.g., potency framing)
that should theoretically show greater convergence with scores on the CRT-A subscales
(e.g., potency bias) vis-a-vis the overall CRT-A scale score. Additionally, efforts could
be made to validate these scales against more specific criteria such as those suggested
above. As research on the differential framing methodology progresses, additional
validity and reliability analyses, such as those described above should be conducted along
with exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Such advanced analyses were simply
not appropriate at this early stage of development. Once true scales and subscales are
created and validated such analyses will be both necessary and appropriate.
Because the initial results are promising, future research should also seek to
expand this or a similar methodology to other construct domains. Indeed, James and
Mazerolle (2002) suggest that differential framing could be used to assess negative
affectivity. Most affect researchers recognize that negative affectivity is best modeled as
a hierarchical construct, with hostility/aggression, anxiety/fear, and depression/sadness as
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potential subfactors comprising affectivity (Bagozzi, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1992;
Watson & Clark, 1992, 1994). If one adopts this model, then the current study, along
with a dissertation by Thoreck (1994), represents an initial foundation from which to
build an implicit framing measure for negative affectivity. Thoreck (1994) applied a
similar differential framing technology for assessing fear of failure and achievement
motivation. His approach used a slightly different item format. However, his initial
validation efforts suggested that the differential framing methodology applied to
achievement motivation and fear of failure could be predictive of criteria such as course
grades and grade point average.
As research on differential framing progresses and reliable and valid scales are
developed, another avenue for future research might include adapting the methodology to
alternative populations, especially ones that might not be receptive to the traditional
Conditional Reasoning formats. For example, highly aggressive adolescents may not be
willing to spend 30 minutes completing the traditional CRT-A. However, this same
sample might be willing to spend the 5 to 10 minutes it would take to complete a
synonym-based differential framing test. Alternatively, younger children may not have
the cognitive and verbal ability to complete the traditional CRTs, this is especially true of
the more cognitively complex CRT designed to measure achievement motivation and fear
of failure (James, 1998). Perhaps, the differential framing methodology could be adopted
for use with these younger children. One possible approach would involve nesting
differential framing within the context of a “choose your own adventure” story.
The format of these stories makes them ideally suited for measuring differential
framing (and Conditional Reasoning). These stories start by presenting several pages of
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information to the child and then bringing them to a decision point. At the decision point,
the child chooses the path of the story (e. g., if you choose option A, jump to page 16; if
you choose option “B” jump to page 48). It might be possible to construct stories around
various themes such as academic achievement. The child would be asked to make a
number of decisions regarding the direction of the story. These decisions could be based
on framing engendered by either achievement motivation or fear of failure. Researchers
could then correlate a child’s response pattern to subsequent manifestations of
achievement behavior (e. g., persistence, school performance). Similar approaches could
be developed for measuring framing associated other constructs (e.g., aggression).
As research on differential framing progresses, a final avenue for future research
might involve integrating implicit framing cognitions with traditional self-report
measures of explicit cognitions. Similar integrations have been undertaken using the
CRT to measure implicit cognitions associated with aggression and achievement
motivation (Bing, Burroughs, Whanger, Green, & James, 2000; Bing, LeBreton, Migetz,
Vennillion, Davison, & James, 2002; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Initial results indicate
that a combination of self-reports and Conditional Reasoning tests may lead to enhanced
prediction of such organizationally relevant variables as deviant workplace behaviors, job
performance, persistence, academic performance, and dispositional affectivity. Similar
integrations using differential framing tests might also prove useful.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study responds to the call offered by James (1998; James &
Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2001) for new indirect measurement systems by
developing a new measure of implicit cognitions based on differential framing. This
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measurement system demonstrated strong predictive validity yielding cross-validities in
the .305 and .405. Furthermore, and in direct contrast to many indirect measurement
systems (e.g., TAT), the current measurement system demonstrated appropriate levels of
internal consistency and test-retest reliability, given its very early stage of development.
The current approach also offers several advantages compared to CRTs such as being
easier to construct, quicker to complete, and perhaps applicable to broader populations
(e. g., children and adolescents). Overall, it appears that differential framing represents a
viable approach to measuring personality-related implicit cognitions; however, much
additional research is needed before a measure of differential framing can be developed
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